The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute

A debate was held on the 6 July in the European Parliament on the Nagorno-Karabakh question. This is a somewhat expanded version of my contribution.

The Nagorno-Karabakh dispute has been frozen for a long time, but there is now a serious danger that it could unfreeze and trigger off a major crisis. In sum, at the end of the war between Azerbaijan and Armenia in 1994, Armenia occupied around a fifth of Azerbaijan’s territory and left about a million people refugees.

But there are other actors as well, to complicate matters – Russia, Turkey, Iran all have interests in the area and could become involved if the Karabakh conflict were to erupt again. Russia is facing an Islamic insurgency in the Northern Caucasus; there are around 25 million Azeris living in Iran; and Turkey has close ties to Azerbaijan. To add to this, a significant part of Europe’s energy needs are met by Azerbaijan.

Furthermore, Azerbaijan has used the money from its energy wealth to acquire a major quantity of modern weaponry, quite logically in the circumstances. Indeed, the amount expended by Azerbaijan on military hardware is said to exceed Armenia’s annual budget by a factor of three.

Last month, Russia attempted yet another mediation between the two parties, in Kazan, but this failed. The level of trust between the two antagonists is too low. The outcome is frustration in Baku and frustration can be a bad counsellor. We shouldn’t be surprised at this frustration. No state enjoys it when a fifth of its sovereign territory is under foreign occupation.  Azerbaijan’s frustration and, for that matter, disappointment at the inaction of the West is further indicated by its decision to join the Non-aligned movement.

An escalation of the conflict, maybe by accident on the ceasefire line, cannot be excluded. That is no one’s interest, and further mediation should be pursued, pursued urgently. I support those who have argued in this debate in favour of an EU involvement along these lines.

Sch. Gy