Friedman’s World

George Friedman’s view of the world* is a bleak one. One of the foremost writers on geostrategy of our time, his basic assumption is that states (he would call them “nations”, of course, because he accepts the usual and misleading Anglo-Saxon notion that they are one and the same) are motivated exclusively by the exercise of power in the national interest. Yes, there is a moral dimension to the exercise of power, he argues, indeed there must be one if it is to be accepted as legitimate, but this concerns only the society of the state that does the exercising, the US in this case. In other words, other states will be assessed by the sole criterion of do their policies serve the interests of the US or not.

Friedman’s starting point is that the US is responsible for about a quarter of the world’s GDP, hence it cannot retreat from global involvement, but its active participation should be about ensuring that no other power can emerge to challenge US’s primacy – I think this is the best word, though there is no hint of primus inter pares – meaning US foreign policy should be aimed at ensuring that no regional hegemon should be strong enough to cause the US a problem. The possibility that other states might be disturbed by the rise of a regional great power is not a part of this calculation. Thus the growing anxiety by China’s neighbours that in its own sphere of interest, Peking (there is no PC “Beijing” on this blog) is impinging their interests, disturbs Friedman not at all. These examples could be multiplied.

This studious ignoring of the interests of states other than the US is, to my mind, a serious flaw in Friedman’s otherwise fascinating analysis, above all because he excludes the possibility of an anti-US coalition being brought into being. The flaw arises because the number of non-Western states with agency, and the capacity to inhibit the will of the US, is increasing. This applies not only to the BRICs, but equally to Mexico, Indonesia, South Korea, Turkey and, maybe, South Africa. If some of these states were to conclude that some kind of an arrangement to stop or hinder some US initiative were in their collective interest, then the US would be in trouble. It would have to expend a good deal of cultural capital and soft power – buying them off, in other words – with the aim of breaking up such an ad hoc coalition. The US is not the only state in the world that could build a coalition of the willing, especially now that George Bush II has set the precedent.

Having said all this, there are two case studies in Friedman’s book that deserve further attention. The section on the Middle East was written well before the “Arab spring” and, it might well be argued, that one of Friedman’s methodological weaknesses is that he appears to be wholly unaware of the Black Swan concept (as elaborated by Nassim Taleb**). The result is that the unexpected, unpredictable and irreversible random event plays no role in Friedman’s analysis and is the weaker for it, because he relies on linear processes. Complexity theory is, then, not a part of his intellectual arsenal.

Still, the Middle East. In sum, the argument is that the primary US interest in the region is to secure the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz, which Iran could block. In the past, Iran was inhibited by the power of the Saudis and Iraq, but GWB destroyed this, in effect making Iraq an Iranian satellite, unless the US stays there militarily, which it won’t. Hence the US must do a deal with Teheran, whatever the Saudis and Israel may say. Given the assumption, the conclusion is logical and, indeed, quite plausible. A partial disengagement from Israel is part and parcel of this strategy; this would generate a good deal of noise in Washington, but the US would ignore this.

The second intriguing assessment concerns Europe. Friedman sees the EU as lacking any serious political cohesion – it’s hard to disagree with him on this – and, indeed, the divisibility of the EU was made manifest in 2003, when “Old Europe” and “New Europe” were identified along the lines of readiness to support the US over the invasion of Iraq or not. The splitting of Europe on this issue has had long term consequences. Arguably, though this is more my argument than Friedman’s, this division gravely weakened the previously very strong US-German relationship and contributed materially to a much stronger autonomous German foreign policy, cf. the way in which Germany was traumatised by the all-azimuths criticism it received for the recognition of Croatia and Slovenia a decade earlier.

The dividing of Europe by the US was evidently just such a gambit that Friedman accepts by the criterion of the US’s national interest, despite the longer term consequences which have been playing themselves out in the last decade. Germany then initiated/ a much more clearly delineated policy of engaging with Russia, in which energy was probably the primary motivating factor, but a distrust of the US was obviously also present in the background. In a word, Germany was placing its national interest above that of its relationship with the US and EU solidarity as well. How Russia has dealt with this development, however, is not a part of Friedman’s assessment, yet should certainly have formed a part of it; after all, if the US can seek to shift the balance of power to its advantage, so can Russia.

Friedman recognises this German-Russian engagement grounded in energy and technology transfers and concludes that the Berlin-Moscow relationship is beginning to emerge as a serious power threat to the US, especially if Berlin pulls France along with it.  This topos is, of course, familiar to any student of geostrategy, it comes straight from Halford Mackinder’s heartland theory. Such a development would seriously disturb the balance of power in Europe, a pro-US balance of course, and leads Friedman to urge a pro-Polish build-up, including military support, as a counterweight. Romania and Hungary would be adjuncts to this strategy, with possibly the Baltic states being included as well. This overall assessment of Europe does sound convincing in the light of what has been happening in the last few years, but possibly underestimates the German interest in sustaining a still viable EU***.

Finally, a few thoughts on where this leaves Hungary. I should add here that Friedman was born in Hungary after the war, but as far as I can make out, this does not influence his mindset, and why should it, anyway? That small states have fewer choices is the base line for Hungarian foreign policy and these countries have to find themselves allies and patrons to ensure the security of their national interests - hence the importance of security architecture like the EU and NATO. Thus if the large states of Western Europe have begun to dilute their commitment to these institutions, Hungary must find alternatives. A strong relationship with the US is self-evidently important, but if Friedman’s assumption of how the US deals with its (small) allies is accurate, then that will not be enough. Hence the orientation towards Poland and Romania acquires a particular significance, especially as these states share many of Hungary’s concerns, like energy security. This is the strategic line that the Fidesz government has been pursuing and, who knows, Friedman might even approve.

Sch. Gy

References

* George Friedman, The Next Decade: Where We’ve Been … and … Where We’re Going (Doubleday, 2011) ISBN 9780385532945

** Nassim Nicholas Taleb, The Black Swan: the Impact of the Highly Improbable, 2nd edition (Random House, 2010)

ISBN: 081297381X

*** ECFR, What does Germany Think About Europe, http://www.ecfr.eu/content/entry/what_does_germany_think_about_europe (downloaded 25 July 2011)