A nagy álvita – avagy a Magyarországról szóló „vita” koregráfiájáról

Amióta kirobbant a vita a magyar médiatörvényről a nemzetközi sajtóban, és amióta a Fidesz kétharmadot szerzett, több külföldön megrendezett vitán is jelen lehettem, ahol természetesen Schöpflin György is védte a mundér becsületét. A nagyjából két éve zajló vitasorozat sok kérdést felvet, sok mindenen elgondolkodtat. Leginkább a(z ál)vita és vitakultúra állapotát illetően, az érvelés minőségét és szintjeit, a vádaskodás és cáfolat lehetetlen koreográfiáját, a meggyőzés és manipuláció összemosását, az érzelemvezéreltséget – a legtöbb esetben ezek az érzelmek negatívak, indulatosak – , és nem utolsósorban a személyeskedést, és a másik totális megsemmisítésének élvezetét.

A külföldi Magyarországról szóló nyilvános (ál)vitáknak van egy állandó koreográfiája, és valahogy a benne részt vevők is hasonló szerepeket játszanak el. Itt hozzátenném, hogy a külföldi vita idegen nyelven zajlik, ami valljuk be, nem éppen egy fair állapot. A helyzet interpretálásában tehát nem csak egy egynyelvű közvetítés van, hanem az idegen nyelv sajátos kulturális szövete, és ráadásul kevesen vannak ezen tudások birtokában.

A koreográfia azonban már a kiindulópontban megbicsaklik, csak ezt valahogy soha nem sikerül leleplezni, nevezetesen, hogy nem az ártatlanság és a jószándék az előfeltevés, hanem a vádak. Az ártatlanság vélelme a Magyarországot ért kritikákban meg sem jelenik. Ahogy voltaképpen a folyamatok sem érdekelnek senkit, és a nemzetközi összehasonlítások sem igazán hatásosak. Magyarország egy egyedül álló jelenség. Érdekes...

Tehát a meghívott előadó elmondja az általa valóságnak vélt igazságot, vagy az igazságnak vélt valóságot. Ez amolyan kinyilatkoztatás szerű, és a mondanivaló szent szövegként funkcionál. És ez a második banánhéj a vitában. Szent szövegeket nem szokás kétségbe vonni, a szakralizáltság pedig komoly dolog. Pláne, ha ezt hiteles, „objektív”, el nem kötelezett személyiség mondja (előny, ha nem magyar, de természetesen a térség szakértője, vagy esetleg külföldön élő magyar, és még nagyobb előny, ha az illető újságíró), ezzel a trükkel le lehet szerelni bárkit, hiszen mégis csak egy kívülálló tárgyilagos értékítéletét hallja mindenki. Sőt, még jobb a helyzet, ha „áldozatokat” sikerül megszólaltatni. Az áldozatiságot sem szokás kétségbevonni; sajnálkozni, együttérezni, fejet csóválni viszont annál inkább, már csak azért is, mert az áldozati az erkölcsi magaslat. És íme a nagy álvita harmadik csavarja, az érzelmi motiváltság, a tények szabad alkalmazása és az ebből eredeztethető szabad asszociációs zsibvásár.

A beszélők által elmondottak tökéletességet jelentenek, és ebben a tekintetben egy zárt rendszert alkotnak. A zártság azonban nem csak a beszédet jellemzi, hanem a beszédet követő vita során sajnos kiderül, hogy maga a kognitív szint is zárt: nem befogadók, hanem kirekesztők a szereplők. A vitázó felek egymás érveléseire nem igazán szoktak reflektálni, ami nem meglepő, hiszen igazságok, valóságok és ezek interpretációjának egymással való ütköztetése zajlik. Csillagok háborúja. A vita így egy hatalmas egymás melletti elbeszélésbe sodródik – amolyan csehovi dráma-szerűen, de nem rezignáltságban, hanem a teljes hergeltségben.

És mikor már majdnem elértük a katarzis állapotát, ekkor kapcsolódhat a vitába a közönség. Csak sajnos katarzis helyett, egy újabb ismétlés hullám következik: a vitázó felek echói hangzanak el újra, amolyan önmegerősítő rítusként. Újból leképeződik az eddigi álvita, annyi különbséggel, hogy most már az érzelmi tölteten lehet a hangsúly. Kérdések, álkérdések és provokációk hangzanak el, terepet adva a személyeskedéseknek. Az érvelés, mint módszer szertefoszlik, világossá válik a vita végcélja: a partner diszkvalifikációja és megsemmisítése. Természetesen a vita után sem történik semmi drámai, mindenki épségben marad, hiszen a zárványok, igazságok és valóságok sértetlenül megmaradnak, és folyamatosan újratermelődnek.

Sajnos, ami ebből a koreográfiából hiányzik az a humor, az önreflexivitás képessége, és az esetlegesség elfogadása. Amíg a legtöbb vitázó fél az egyetlen létező igazságban gondolkodik, mindezt objektívnek véli és képtelen önmaga kritikájára, addig minden vita fölösleges. Amíg nem figyel oda a partnere mondanivalójára, és nem tud a mondandó és a személy között különbséget tenni, nem is érdemes nekikezdeni.

Az álvita pedig egy jó módszer a hergelésre, de nem a megbeszélésre.

kng

Transitions, some general thoughts

The Sixth Annual Lennart Meri conference, organised by the Estonian International Centre for Defence Studies, was held in Tallinn on 11-13 May. I was asked to speak at a session entitled “Stolen Promises? Learning from the Ukrainian and Egyptian Revolutions”. This is an edited text of my contribution.

The central objective of institution building must be to bring formal and informal institutions as close to each other as possible. This is much more difficult than appears at first sight, not least because the models – both explicit and implicit – are derived from the alien experience of Europe and US.

But if the gap between the formal and the informal is too great, then the formal institutions will not work as they are supposed to. They are very likely to be captured by informality and, in consequence, they will not generate trust. Crucially, the institutions that are supposed to mediate power between rulers and ruled will be deployed to the advantage of one group against others.

Closing this gap between the formal and informal is especially vital in the construction of legality and the rule of law.

Understanding the sociology of the society in question is essential, otherwise the solutions will not work well. Distinguishing between structural factors and contingent ones is also vital. The world is very diverse, so beware of the one-size fits all universalism.

Thus in societies that are based on extended family systems or patron-client networks or ethno-religious communities, Western-type citizenship concepts will be a façade. Those operating these systems will become adept at using the language that the West expects to hear, but matters will remain at the level of words. Note too that such concealment is well understood in the non-West. It is particularly misleading to refer to these phenomena as “sectarianism” or “nepotism”, because that conceals the sociological reality of the society in question, as well as importing an external normativity.

Design questions.

[1] Deal with the past rapidly, open all the secret police archives, the pain will not last more than a couple of years (GDR). Otherwise, the past will poison the political atmosphere. A lingering sense of injustice is corrosive.

[2] A caesura is very helpful, a revolution or a narrative of revolution is useful here (the Velvet Revolution in the Czech Republic is one example). A radical break between the past and the future can also help to marginalise the members of the ancien regime. If the carry-over from the past is too great, then this can be a serious brake on political development and carries with the dangers of some kind of a restoration.

[3] A citizenship concept should be formulated early on, not least as part of the new constitutional order. It should be inclusive, but not wholly open otherwise people will conclude that it’s not worth that much. If religion is a part of your society, then make it explicit, give it a formal role in the system. The secularised West finds this very difficult to understand.

[4] Crucially, start from the existing social structure and from ideology or aspirations or wish fulfilment fantasies. Do not accept unthinkingly what Western advisers tell you (read Janine Wedel’s book Collision and Collusion). The straightforward import of institutions is seldom successful anyway.

[5] Note that society’s expectations of change will intensify (rising expectations) and these cannot all be met. The lack of society’s political experience can mean expectations that are impossible to meet in practice; the result can be a kind of naïve cynicism.

[6] Do not neglect the symbols and rituals that sustain political systems (the West, with its mythic narrative of rationality does not really understand this). They are a way of including quite disparate groups.

[7] Equality and inequality. Once you reach a certain level of economic wellbeing, equivalence is a better goal. There will never a wholly equal distribution of power, but access to power, opportunity and status can remain open, even in plural societies, i.e. ethnically divided. The quest for full equality is dystopic and can legitimate authoritarian patterns of redistribution.

Sch. Gy.

 

From Occupation to Occupation: Hungary’s Brief Encounter with Democracy 1944-1947

A conference was held in the European Parliament on the 9 May with the title “Occupation after Liberation”. This is a somewhat expanded version of my contribution .

Hungary was a German ally in the Second World War from 1941 and took major losses – around 100,000 casualties – at Voronezh. In exchange, as it were, it received back some of the (mostly) Hungarian-inhabited territories that it had lost under the Treaty of Trianon in 1920. At the same time, Hungary was not a Nazi state. While constrained to undertake forced labour and subjected to other forms of discrimination, Jews were not threatened with extermination. More remarkably, the Social Democrats were still sitting Parliament and, given wartime conditions, the press remained relatively free. Clandestine negotiations with the Allies continued and was a source of growing irritation to the Germans. In March 1944, they occupied Hungary, launched the extermination of the Jews that claimed over half a million victims and eventually allowed a Hungarian Nazi regime (the Arrow Cross) to take power (October 1944).

The Red Army entered Hungary in the same month, began the siege of Budapest in December, and ended hostilities on Hungarian soil in April 1945. There were enormous losses and terrible devastation.

The Hungarian communists were weak with perhaps 800 members at the end of the war. They had the unique distinction of having run the only failed communist regime, the 133 days of the Hungarian Soviet Republic of 1919, to look back on, hence it had to rely very extensively on Soviet backing to achieve its aims. The Allied Control Commission was largely run by the Kremlin and was a primary actor in this process. The communists’ appetite grew with the eating. They began expecting a major success in the November 1945 elections, but gained only 17 percent.

A kind of partial democracy existed until 1947, though it was constantly attacked by the communists with the active support of the Soviets. The 1945 coalition government was a decidedly strange institution in that it included its own opposition, the left. The communists did what they could to destabilise the government from within, above all to destroy the unity of the majority Smallholders – this was the so-called “salami tactics”, destroying the Smallholders slice by slice. The communists simultaneously took control of the machinery of state when and where they could and repeatedly sabotaged the policies of the democratic forces. The communists had two further advantages – they were untainted by the failures of the interwar years and, equally, given their association with the Soviet Union, they basked in the reflected glory of being on the winning side in the Second World War, something which could not be said of the right. Their actions were marked by great dynamism, unscrupulousness and a readiness to employ terror against their opponents.

As against this, strategically, Hungary was of secondary significance to the Kremlin and probably it had not definitively decided what future Hungary (and Czechoslovakia) should have in the communist system. This allowed the non-communists some hope that they could survive as political forces. It was not to be.

By late 1947, it was made clear (at Szklarska Poręba) that full communist control in the Stalinist mode was to be the future. This situation was exacerbated by the breach with Tito in 1948 (Hungary was the front line against Jugoslavia and a planned invasion would have used Hungarian territory). The Social Democrats were “merged” with the CP in 1948 and other parties, not least those which had performed well in the 1947 elections, were banned. The CP itself was purged, Moscow style, beginning in 1949 with classical show trials, torture, confessions, executions, the lot – they can be seen as a purification ritual, carrying the message that the party was omnipotent and omniscient. The brief encounter with democracy was well and truly over.

Stalinisation followed rapidly, with Soviet advisors to lend a hand when and where the Hungarian comrades were proving inadequate. From 1950 onwards, the bourgeoisie was deported to the countryside in appalling conditions (many died). Collectivisation drove tens of thousands of peasants into newly established factories, again in appalling conditions and coercion continued to be the CP’s primary instrument of power. Between 1952 and 1955 (four years), 1.1 million people were interrogated by the forces of coercion, and some 450,000 were interned or imprisoned, i.e. 5 percent of the population.

There is no time to examine how 1956 Revolution came about, but the event was, indeed, revolutionary. Its objectives were the rejection of all previous systems, the creation of new institutions (like the workers’ councils) and mass participation. The revolution was committed to freedom and to democracy through multiparty elections, though without any return to capitalism. It’s another question whether this would have worked. The Red Army returned to suppress the revolution, trials and executions followed (c.500 people), and around 250,000 persons left the country (c.100,000) returned. This was the third communist takeover in Hungary ((1919, 1948, 1956) and the fourth time that a Russian army invaded the country (1849, 1915, 1944, 1956).

But the revolution, though it had failed, left a deep mark on Hungary. It set up limits for both rulers and the ruled. The party was thoroughly traumatised by its evident collapse as an institution and the realisation that the people – workers, peasants, intellectuals – were utterly hostile to communism. Hungarian society, on the other hand, understood that it was powerless against communism as long as the USSR was prepared to use the Red Army (cf. Czechoslovakia 1968). Change came only in the 1980s when Gorbachev signalled that the Red Army would no longer shield the CP against the people.

The communist mindset, however, lives on, it influences the communist successor party (the rebranded socialists) and takes the form of not accepting alternative views of the world, as well as regarding power as something to be monopolised. At the same time, the fact that the Western left has unthinkingly embraced the former communists means that the Western left has uncritically accepted the communist past and mindset.

Sch. Gy.