The Political Field in Europe

The political spectrum in Europe is changing, indeed it is doing so in a far-reaching and unpredictable way, amounting to a paradigm shift. It is notoriously difficult to see the deeper changes that are taking place around one, so inevitably the argument here is somewhat tentative.

For a generation, European political assumptions were dominated by a left-wing hegemony. Non-left wing ideas were harder to put forward, they were ignored or scorned, as the naturalised assumptions – the standard epistemology of the time – accepted these left-wing propositions without further question as the norm. This assumption-set remains influential, notably in the political elite and in the media dependent on it, but is declining in wider society. The outcome is growing gap between elites and society – this is an important aspect of the current transformation.

There are various interacting factors that explain this paradigm shift, some from intellectual history, others from sociology, others yet from demography.

The European left is deeply rooted in Enlightenment rationality which it regards as the sole mode of thought and has made its monopoly thought-world. It rejects alternatives as irrational or absurd or dangerous and it will not tolerate competitors. Whether we are looking at Western Social Democracy or Marxism-Leninism, this claim, that the left was grounded in rationality and that all other approaches were alien has been very deeply rooted. It is worth noting that the protagonists of economic rationality as the primary motivating force of human action were de facto allies, even when they supported free markets over rational redistribution.

The rise of post-modern thought, however, has centrally questioned Enlightenment rationality as the sole or preeminent mode of argument, it has stressed the contingency of rationalism and sought to unmask the interests hidden therein, so, for example, post-colonial theory has subjected the Enlightenment to radical deconstruction as a European or Western device underpinning the West’s bid for global power.

Classically the key elements of the left included egalitarianism, ouvrierism, support for organised labour and, basically, ensuring the participation of the (primarily male) manual working class in the political process. As the last third of the 20th century wore on, these objectives were slowly replaced by the creation of the rainbow coalition (feminism, gender mainstreaming, immigrants), by a notionally anti-Eurocentric universalism (global human rights, democracy) and environmentalism. The impact of the last is worth particular attention, because it anchored the left in a semi-sacralised area, nature, as something transcending the legacy of Enlightenment rationality, of which the left always claimed to be the best guarantor

The collapse of communism made the Marxist assumptions of the left with respect to the class-based nature of politics meaningless; this was enhanced and exacerbated by the decline of manufacturing industry, by class dealignment and the rise of the service sector. Ironically, however, it may be that a Marxian analysis of a new proletariat, service industry workers, is now highly relevant.

Globalisation effectively devalued the work of a sizeable section of the manual working class, the semi-skilled above all. Neither left nor right has found a solution to this, but it has left behind a resentful stratum of, especially, male manual workers without much a perspective. The resulting inequalities have inevitably weakened the bonds of citizenship. Equally, the negative consequences of globalisation have turned a section of society against universalism.

The demographic factor deserves analysis in this context. The members of the so-called 1968 generation, the soixante-huitards, were unusual in that the post-war baby boom was able generate its own critical mass, resist the socialisation that is usually enforced by the older generations and to give birth to a self-contained sub-culture. The great majority was, of course, reintegrated into society over time, but many of the assumptions of 1968 remained encoded in their thinking. What we are witnessing now is the slow exit of the 68 generation, their gradual disappearance from the political scene, the dilution of the hegemony that they have enjoyed, hence other values can acquire greater visibility

The role of religion also requires attention here. Nowhere was secularism as far-reaching as in Europe, in consequence of the success and strength of the Enlightenment paradigm. The rest of the world did not follow Europe in its secularism. However, many of assumptions of secularism are encoded in human rights and the European definition of democracy which has placed religion in the background, as a private experience, without much presence in the public sphere.

This state of affairs may be changing. First, there is Eric Kaufman’s argument that religious families have more children hence there is an implied a demographic trend that the number of believers will increase – it may be that this argument is too linear, still it is a trend worth watching. If it does eventuate, then  religion is very likely to return to the public sphere and, assuming democracy, will demand representation and voice. Then, second, one of the consequences of Islamic immigration has been to upgrade a vague, unspecified Christian identity. Third, there is the phenomenon known as  “believing without belonging”; this is a sociological reality, affecting a statistically significant section of the population. The inference is that that they are resistant to Enlightenment rationality and ready to give soft support to political forces that are open to religion, and this cannot be the left, with its anti-religious stance (some individuals on the left are, however, believers). Finally,  religious commitment is much stronger in Central and South-Eastern Europe, than in the EU-15 and this is very likely to have a certain impact on Europe as a whole, not least as a reservoir of faith.

However, the great transformer was and is immigration. There never was any democratic legitimation for mass immigration, the voters were never consulted on this and never gave it their consent, they were simply told that it was good for them and was needed economically. Here the gap between elites and society has been the most acute.

The cultural consequences of large-scale immigration have provided an opportunity structure for the far right, with the emergence of parallel societies that everyone was supposed to “celebrate” (for what it’s worth, this is a singularly vapid concept; is cultural exchange invariably “enriching”?); the moderate right broadly accepted the case made by the left, never asked the hard questions,  given the very deep fear of being labelled “racist”. The universalist assumptions of the left won a victory here, but this looks increasingly like one of the battles fought by King Pyrrhus of Epirus.

The far-right, on the other hand, likes being accused of racism because this makes it feel authentic. In sum, what we have is that radicalism, which was left wing for so long, from 1945 onwards, has migrated to the right  (the 1930s offer an interesting parallel), and there is no credible far left. The defeat of Nazism did, indeed, make the far right toxic, but this is gradually wearing out

What, then, is the role of the moderate parties of the left? The left is still dealing with the collapse of communism and globalisation, but its response is universalism and the construction of far-right enemies, including attempts to link the moderate right with the far right. The question may fairly be put: is there a left wing theory of the democratic centre right? At the same time, the insistence of the left on the Fascist danger, on labelling so many phenomena that it does not like as “racist” or “populist” or “xenophobic” simply enhances the role of the far-right as a radical and “pure” alternative.

The democratic centre right, however, has been struggling to redefine itself, not least when so much of the political agenda of the last 30-40 years has been monopolised by the left. In sum, it stands for, conservatism, Oakeshott’s organic tradition, and Christian Democracy; for solidarity, social protectionism, ideals of community, but with a clear emphasis on the individual and individual responsibility; as far market freedom is concerned, there is a divergence between Anglo-Saxon right, which has embraced market fundamentalism, and Christian Democracy which accepts a degree of control of the market

In all,there are serious gaps in the democratic political system. Thus democracy as understood and implemented fails to answer a series of questions, notably the perceived gap between elites and society; the failure of multiculturalism to integrate non-European migrants and the corresponding rise of parallel societies; the emptiness of the proposition that citizenship is sufficient to secure integration; the failure to deal with the structural unemployment of a sizeable section of the manual working class; and, possibly the most destructive, the universalism that ends up ignoring one’s own national community in favour of a (hypothetical) global world community, which in reality is a quintessentially elite concept.

The far right is the primary beneficiary of these gaps in the system, but a centre right that is capable of reintegrating itself with the nation and the national interest to overcome the elite-society gap, of putting forward a consistent message (see the entry for 8 May) and can address the fears of cultural marginalisation triggered off by globalisation has excellent prospects.

Sch.Gy