After 1945: Cold War, Cold Peace

contribution to the launch of Mihály Fülöp’s book, The Unfinished Peace: the Council of Foreign Ministers and the Hungarian Peace Treaty of 1947 at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, 3 May 2013

Why did the attempts to establish peace after the WW1 fail? How was this different from after WW2? Why was peacemaking concluded in the particular form that it took, in other words what were the contingent circumstances that shaped the attitudes of those who took the policy decisions? And how did they understand the other players? In other words, I put the stress on chance, accident, happenstance and, it may be, human frailty, on the fallibility of knowledge, on the interpretation of precedent and on unintended consequences. Linear thinking, that B followed A, hence there is a causal nexus between the two, is a classic example of error. Assumptions of linearity are deeply coded in Western thinking.

[1] There was terrible loss of life in WW1, but this was mostly military; the civilian population affected only where there was direct fighting, was not targeted. Besides, on the Western front, the fighting was static, thereby sparing the civilian population. On the Italian front, the fighting took place in a relatively narrow area, whilst the civilians on the Eastern front were not a part of anyone’s focus. WW2 was different, though fewer soldiers were killed, civilian deaths and urban destruction were horrendous. Hence the imperative to eliminate war from European history was far stronger than after 1918.

[2] There was a learning process. The Paris Peace Settlement was about revenge, maximising one’s security by adding territory, about dismantling the landward empires of the east (to ensure that they would never again threaten the victorious allies); to that can be added war guilt and reparations (Kriegsschuld is both), there was no attempt to plan for reconciliation and the Western allies, the victors had no real conception of how the new states that they brought into being would function as states. The mental model was the slow dismantling of the Ottoman empire in the 19th century, but no one really cared about the semi-functional cases that came into being. After WW2, things were different, partly because the motives were different (the destruction was on a different quality and scale), partly because the Paris Peace Settlement model was seen to have failed (evidently).

[3] The process of modernity was far from complete in 1914, by 1945 it was largely – not wholly finished – the conversion of peasants into citizens and the corresponding enlargement of the public sphere. The two wars accelerated this process. This subsequently gave democracy a different quality from the interwar period, by diffusing power.

[4] Peace was easier to make in 1947, because it did not really have Central and South-Eastern Europe to bother with. The region was under Soviet control, for many in the West this was a stabilising process, an attitude that lasted throughout the communist period.

[5] There was and is an element of disdain towards Central and South-Eastern Europe in this.  The two world wars both had their casus belli in the region and post hoc operated as propter hoc, causation is frequently attributed on this flawed basis. For many this became a good reason to put the region into cold storage, Central and South-Eastern Europe being given their statehood was seen tacitly somehow as a historic error. The cold storage metaphor reemerged shortly after 1989.

[6] There were further lessons learned from the interwar period. (a) Populations could be moved en masse, forcibly if need be or exterminated or ethnically cleansed for the purpose of establishing mono-ethnic, homogeneous states – mono-ethnicity was seen as a stabilising factor. The experience of the League of Nations with the nationalities issue was central in this. The fact that this was a copy of Nazi methods troubled no one. (b) Despite the Paris Peace Settlement, while “guilt” was redefined as “war criminality”, thus a matter of individual rather collective action, nevertheless victorious and defeated states were treated differently. The former got their territories back (Alsace-Lorraine), the latter had to live with losing territory, whether these were gained in WW2 or as a result of WW1 (Italy). Poland both lost and gained. Bulgaria, though on the defeated side, actually gained territory. Hungary lost what it had acquired in 1938-1941 and even lost the Bratislava bridgehead. Czechoslovakia lost Subcarpathian Ruthenia, which could have been a gain.

[7] There was another tacit principle in operation. The shapes of states could change, but no new states could come into being (unlike 1918). The Baltic states, having been swallowed by the Soviet Union, stayed swallowed.

[8] Even more important was the proposition that the arrangement and configuration of states now arrived at was to be regarded as permanent, if not actually immanent. States, therefore, were no longer to be seen as products of history, but were sacralised in their existing form as supratemporal and, equally, as supraspatial. Helsinki finalised this as between West and East. German reunification was the one exception, or was intended to be. Clio does not like to be fettered.

[9] With a few exceptions, decolonisation could not and would not apply to Europe, even where the power relationship between metropole and region was colonial or semi-colonial. Cyprus, Malta and Ireland were the exceptions, though Iceland also falls into this category. Colonial or ex-colonial status has not been extended to the former subject territories of the landward empires of Europe and that includes the Soviet Union. True, they have not really sought it and the former overseas imperial states have enough post-colonial guilt to worry about anyway. Yet in the post-1991 world, where victimhood and victimhood competition play a vital role, the demand for ex-colonial status could have brought considerable advantages, even if it would have been immensely complex in some cases, with double and triple colonisations.

[10] The idea of Europe was reconfigured thanks to the recognition that only by reincorporating Germany and working hard to sustain the Paris-Bonn axis as its centre could the Europe of the Cold Peace be brought into being. No more Erbfeindschaft, therefore. Note that the absence of Franco-German competition over Central Europe, something that had bedevilled the region in the interwar years, was a helpful condition in this process – the dividend of the Cold Peace, one might say.

[11] Then, the new Europe was committed to democracy. This proposition was not so self-evident in 1950 as it is today. In the 1930s authoritarian systems were seen as normal and dynamic. Somewhere there emerged the proposition that democracy makes war impossible. The UK chose to stay outside this system, found itself obliged to accept the newly constructed power centre on the Continent, but then did what it could to prevent it from converting its economic power into political power.

[12] In this new Europe, state sovereignty remains, but some of that sovereignty has been  transferred to Brussels transferred voluntarily, or mostly so. Compare here the Brezhnev doctrine of limited sovereignty proclaimed in the aftermath of the invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. The EU is, in this sense, functioning on the basis of a limited sovereignty, but it is different from Brezhnev’s variant in that it is consensual, albeit small states have only a limited choice about falling into line. Ideally, the trade-off is that by acceding to this EU version of limited sovereignty, they gain something – the relationship between them and large powers is now properly regulated. Again this can be regarded as one of the benefits of the Cold Peace.

[13] The number of inter-state relations to be managed was relatively small – the proliferation of new states after 1918 was much disliked – hence in the West much revolved around the relationship between France and Germany. Scandinavia opted for a trade relationship with the UK, the Mediterranean dictatorships only rejoined Europe in the 1970s. The absence of Central and South-Eastern Europe in a way helped the coming into being of a “civilised” Europe, Western Europe, without the hairy barbarians to the east. Indeed, for 45 years Europe had a negative other, an alterity, to the east and this was extremely helpful in consolidating the very particular Europe that was being constructed by the Monnet method. The formation of Europe that was brought into being from the 1950s onwards and the European identity that was constructed around it are the evidence. The Cold Peace was, on this argument, a very helpful condition indeed to the European integration process and the emergence of the new Europe, though it’s hard to say whether or not it was a necessary condition.

[14] Was the 1947 peace-making a stepping stone towards the Cold War? Only in part, in that it made few gestures towards reconciliation between former enemies (these were early days), but did attempt to close a longue durée chapter of European history, that of territorial rearrangement after a war. There is no question in my mind that the absolute conservatism of the US towards territorial rearrangement, as well as the looming presence of the Soviet Union, were at the back of this, presumably in the belief that definitive frontiers promote stability. In political reality, this conservatism shifts a possible political fault line from the international to the domestic political arena, where in general majorities are strong enough to keep down transfrontier minorities or they do a deal (Belgium, Netherlands). Note that as the concept and practice of democracy evolved – an ever wider public sphere and the acceptance of minority action in politics (some minorities only), proliferating forms of representation – the conditions of territorial stability require a good deal more accommodation than once upon time.

[15] The 45 years of peace, however, the unintended child of the 1947 Peace Treaties, did have a consequence that few ever even conceived of at the time – the division of Europe left the West entirely without knowledge and experience of Central Europe. Hence the EU had no idea what to do with states that have had an utterly different history – the Mediterranean dictatorships were not a good model – and which have agendas of their own at odds with deep-rooted Western assumptions. Nor did the West understand – couldn’t? wouldn’t? – the dehumanising quality of communist rule. The putative coming together of Europe after 1989 and 1991 coincided with the euphoria of the victory over communism, the “end of history”, the unipolar moment, the US as hyperpower and a corresponding disdain for difference, not major difference, but enough minor differences to cause irritation. Central Europe just won’t conform and the West refuses to apply the rules of multiculturalism to Central Europe. The reason, presumably, is that doing so would threaten the West’s own assumptions, its own narratives, its universalist aspirations and the worldwide validity of whatever the West decrees. This source of friction, again a consequence of the Cold Peace, will run and run.

Sch. Gy.

Hány Európa, pontosan?

Kívülről úgy néz ki, mint egy unió, mint egy szépen integrált nemzetközi szervezet, amely hűen tartja magát az „egység a sokféleségben” elvéhez. Azonban aki közelebbről ismeri az Európai Uniót, az gyorsan rájön, hogy a valóságban ez már egy ideje másképpen történik, sőt, gyakran radikálisan eltér a látszatól.

Kezdjük a demokrácia kérdésével: az EU szigorúan ragaszkodik a demokráciához, ahogyan ezt a portugál elnökség idején ki is nyilvánította az akkori miniszterelnök, Socrates: „a demokrácia Európának a DNS-e”. Szép, szép, de mi a valóság? A kezdet kezdetén, a második világháború háború után, az elitek elhatározták, hogy csak egy integráltabb Európa lesz képes elkerülni a háborúzást, a „soha többé” elvét hangoztatva. Sikerült is, de ennek meglett az ára: az integráció elitvezéreltsége. Elitek hozták létre az EUt, a népet alig-alig vonták be a folyamatba. Addig ameddig az európai projekt sikeres volt, ez nem is nagyon zavarta a kedélyeket, de a 2008-as válság óta ez megfordult. Nyersen: a nemzet-államok elitjei sokkal inkább saját nemzeti társadalmukat részesítik előnyben (finoman mondva), mint Európát, ill. az EU többi társadalmát. Egyszóval amíg az elitek integrációja nagyrészt megtörtént – bár itt is vannak szépséghibák – az európai nép, a démosz nem jött létre. Tehát itt van egy démosz nélküli demokrácia. Fából vaskarika, forró jég?

Ez a helyzet pedig egyre inkább kiéleződik, mivel a gazdasági válságban a globalizáció örvénye magával ragadja az eurót, feltételezvén, hogy az egyes ország bankjai sok helyütt a csőd szélén állnak; az érintett országok kormányai ezt nem engedhetik meg, mert ez egy krachot produkálna, így inkább fedezik a bankok kintlévőségeit, de a hitelezők – a hírhedt kötvénypiac – ezt nem hiszik el. Ennek következtében az eurózóna gyengébb államai növekvő „szolidaritást” várnak el a erősebbektől: a szolidaritás ez esetben komoly anyagi támogatást, tetemes összegeket jelentene. A gazdaságilag erősebb tagállamok erre nem nyitottak: Ciprus ennek fogyasztja a levét.

Az elitvezérelt, de politikailag csak kismértékben támogatott törésvonal mellett, létrejött Európa gazdasági törésvonala is, amelynek földrajzi dimenziója is van: az északi tagállamok alapvetőleg sikeresen gazdálkodnak, a déliek kevésbé: Görögország a legkirívóbb példa. Mi ennek a magyarázata? Egyszerű választ adott erre a finn miniszterelnök, Jyrki Katainen, egy tavalyi konferencián: mi betartjuk a szabályokat. Nem kell nagyon keresni ennek a mondatnak a folytatását, bár ezt nem mondta ki Katainen: ők nem. A déliek az „ők”.

Az északi és a déli Európa mellett fellelhető ráadásul a keleti is: a közép-európaiak, akik még mindig „új” tagállamoknak számítanak, hellyel-közzel egy fenntartható gazdasági stratégiát követtek, jóllehet ez sem vonatkozik mindenkire. Magyarország állapota javulóban van, de még távol áll a jóval kedvezőbb helyzetet fenntartó Lengyel- és Csehországtól, bár az is igaz, hogy perspektíváink meglehetősen jobbak, mint Romániáé.

A negyedik törésvonal viszont máshol húzódik: az eurózóna tagok és nem-tagok között. Ez most azért is aktuális, mert jelenleg az eurózónán belül hatalmas vita folyik a jövőről: vitathatatlan, hogy a közös pénznemet csak egy sokkal szorosabban integrált rendszer segítségével lehet megmenteni, de ezt a szorosabb integráltságot a nem-elit európai társadalmak nem fogadják el. Patthelyzet. Ha mégis létrejönne pl. egy közös bank-felügyelet az eurózónán belül, akkor mi lesz a nem eurózóna tagállamokkal (az eurózsargon ezeket az országokat „pre-in-eknek” nevezi; ez a kifejezés még angolul is sérti az ember fülét)? A nem-tagok stakeholderek a közös pénznemben, de nem világos, hogy a mostani tagok mennyire hajlandók a leendő tagok érdekeit figyelembe venni.

Az ötödik törésvonal az Európa-szintű politikáról szól. Az elmúlt pár év során egyre inkább észlelhető az egyesült baloldal fellépése – elsősorban az Európai Parlamentben, de valamennyire a Bizottságban is. A négy baloldali frakció – a szocialisták, a liberálisok, a zöldek és a szélsőbaloldal – egyre gyakrabban működtetnek egy közös frontot a jobb-középpel szemben, illetve ellene. Ez a baloldali összefogás két szempontból is új. Egyrészt nincs olyan honi parlament, ahol ez elképzelhető lenne, mondhati az európai baloldal szabadon lebeg valahol, nem nagyon képviseli szavazóit, megtestesíti azonban az elitvezéreltséget, sőt azt valamennyire erősíti is. Hogy ez milyen legitimációval rendelkezik, arról jobb hallgatni.

A másik újítása ennek a baloldalnak a közép-jobboldal marginalizálása az integráció kontextusában. Csaknem kezdettől fogva létezett ugyanis egy bizonyos integráció-barát együttműködés a jobb- és baloldal között: ennek egyre kevesebb jelét látom a Parlamentben, bár az, hogy milyen alapon nevezi magát demokratikusnak a baloldal, amikor a jobboldalt kizárja az európai politizálásból, nem világos előttem.

A baloldal átalakulásának magyarázatát mégsem a többlépcsős Európában kell keresni, hanem valahol máshol: az 1990-es években alakult ki az un. liberális konszenzus, választ adva a baloldal útkeresésére a kommunizmus letűnése következtében. Ennek a liberális konszenzusnak a fő ismérvei az emberi jogok hangsúlyozása, az erkölcsi követelmények előtérbe helyezése, a politika átmoralizálása, és az elitista politizálás monopóliumának vindikálása.

Ezt a konszenzust mellesleg szőröstül-bőröstül átvette a magyar baloldal, így pedig fenntarthatónak gondolta az egypárt rendszerből átörökölt monopóliumot, demokrácia ide, demokrácia oda. Ami talán sokkal fontosabb az EU szintjén: a Bizottság nagyrészt magáévá tette a konszenzust, ennek előfeltételezéseit és követelményeit. Ez ad egyfajta magyarázatot arra, hogy miért is hallgat a Bizottság a magyar baloldal híreszteléseire, és hogy miért is ítéli el annyira hangzatosan a Fidesz-kormányt politikáját.

Végül egy pár szót az opt-out intézményéréről: ez egy egyfajta kivételezés, amelynek fényében az adott tagállam nem vesz részt az EU egyik vagy másik programjában: a britek és dánok nem kívánták bevezetni az eurót, így kértek és kaptak egy opt-outot. Hasonló a helyzet a Schengeni egyezménnyel, legalább is ami a briteket illeti, bár itt az írek is kénytelenek voltak követni Nagy Britanniát, mivel a két ország közti forgalom annyira sűrű. Az opt-out legszembeszökőbb példája talán mégis az alapjogi charta, amelyből szintén a britek hiányoznak, a lengyelekkel és – ez még vitatott – a csehekkel együtt.

A Nagy Britannia és az EU közti törésvonal egyébként már több, mint 20 éves – Thatcher asszony bruges-i beszédével kezdődött (1988). Azóta a britek, de mindenesetre az angolok az európaiakkal szembeni ellenszenve csak erősödött, míg Skóciában ez nem annyira intenzív. Nem túlzás azt állítani, hogy az angolok EU-ellenszenve valójában az angol nemzeti tudat kibontakozása – nacionalizmusnak is nevezhető – bár az angolok ez ellen hevesen tiltakoznak, mivel náluk ilyen nincs, nacionalizmus csak tőlük keletre létezik. Ez a törésvonal egyre intenzívebb. A múlt év vége felé több felmérés is kimutatta, hogy az angolok többsége a kilépés, a Brixit mellett van.

Az EU-ban erre nincs precedens, igaz a Lisszaboni Szerződés igenis lehetővé teszi a kilépést. És valóban a demokratikus gondolkodás szellemében, ha egy ország népe a kilépést támogatja hosszabb ideje, akkor ezt illik elfogadni. Az viszont, hogy egy ilyen fordulatnak milyen nem szándékolt következményei lehetnek, már más kérdés: mindenképpen szétzilálná az eddigi integrációt, annak teljesítményeivel, kudarcaival együtt, és ezzel az európai stabilitást is veszélyeztetné. Mi pedig tudjuk, hogy ilyen helyzetben mit rejtegethet a jövő: jaj a kisállamoknak.

__________________________

egy kis eurózsargon szójegyzék:

Brixit, brit exit, a Grexit, az esetleges görög kilépés mintájára

liberális konszenzus, baloldali összefogáas az összes többi politikai erő ellen

opt-out, kb. az általános szabály alóli kivételezés

pre-ins, leendő eurózona tagok

stakeholder, kb. érdekelt fél

szolidaritás, papíron az egységes európai fejlődés alapja, a valóságban az a minimum, amelyet a gazdagabb tagállamok a szegényebbek felé hajlandók átcsoportosítani

_____________________________

Sch. Gy.

The Raven – a much maligned bird

Human societies frequently make attributions to animals. Foxes are cunning, bears hug you, badgers badger you (for some reason), the eagle is noble, the sparrow is chirpy and so on. But it’s hard to think of another animal that has such a hard time as the raven.

The ravenstone is so called because ravens would sit by the execution block hoping for a bite from the executed victim. Someone who is ravenous is very, very hungry indeed.

Poe’s Raven is a bird of doom, issuing denials at the end of several stanzas, uttering the ominous “nevermore”.

“this ominous bird of yore -
What this grim, ungainly, ghastly, gaunt, and ominous bird of yore
Meant in croaking 'Nevermore.' ”

As every Londoner knows, if the ravens should ever leave the Tower of London, the kingdom will fall, hence the birds with their clipped wings, the prisoners of the Tower.

 

Cassius, towards the denouement of Julius Caesar, just before the fatal battle of Philippi, sees the raven (with the crow and the kite) as a grim omen:

“This morning are they [two mighty eagles] fled away and gone;
And in their steads do ravens, crows and kites,
Fly o'er our heads and downward look on us,
As we were sickly prey: their shadows seem
A canopy most fatal, under which
Our army lies, ready to give up the ghost.’

At least Thomas Middleton is relatively neutral about the raven, a night bird, sure, with a poor voice, but not otherwise nasty:

“Ravens croak on chimneys' tops;

The cricket in the chamber hops;

The nibbling mouse is not asleep,

But he goes peep, peep, peep, peep, peep”

And that’s just in English. I think we can add the Scots ballad “The twa corbies” to the list, corbie can be variously raven and crow.

“As I was walking all alane,
I heard twa corbies makin a mane;
The tane unto the ither say,
"Whar sall we gang and dine the-day?"

"In ahint yon auld fail dyke,
I wot there lies a new slain knight”

and, they go on,

So we may mak oor dinner swate."

"Ye'll sit on his white hause-bane,
And I'll pike oot his bonny blue een;
Wi ae lock o his gowden hair
We'll theek oor nest whan it grows bare."

From the TLS we also learn:

“A raven deity figures, we are told, in the cosmologies of many cultures, sometimes as the creator of the world, the bringer of light to the world, or the bearer of civilization. In Celtic mythology there is, among other raven deities, the giant-king Bran the Blessed. (Bran means raven in Welsh, and the bird may be regarded as his emblem.)”

Then:

Ravens (and Crows) are associated with war and death in Irish mythology. In Cornish folklore crows are associated with the "otherworld" and so must be treated with respect. In Australian Aboriginal mythology, the crow is an ancestral being. In Buddhism the protector of the Dharma is represented by a crow in one of his physical/earthly forms.

The raven is revered as God by the indigenous peoples of the Pacific Northwest in North America and in northeast Asia. Several totem poles erected by native Americans in Washington, Alaska and Oregon depict ravens and the stories they feature in. In the Old Testament of the Bible there are several references to common Ravens. In the British Isles, ravens were symbolic to the Celts. In Irish mythology, the goddess Morrígan alighted on the hero Cú Chulainn's shoulder in the form of a raven after his death.

In many post-conversion Western traditions, ravens have long been considered to be birds of ill omen and death, in part because of the negative symbolism of their all-black plumage and the eating of carrion. In Sweden, ravens are known as the ghosts of murdered people, and in Germany as the souls of the damned. In Danish folklore, valravne that ate a king's heart gained human knowledge, could perform great malicious acts, could lead people astray, had superhuman powers, and were "terrible animals"

In French, not only is La Fontaine’s raven, Maître Corbeau (with cheese), vain, but also stupid, allowing himself to be flattered by the fox (cunning as ever), who says to him, sing, your voice is so beautiful:

Sans mentir, si votre ramage
Se rapporte à votre plumage,
Vous êtes le Phénix des hôtes de ces bois."

(Really, if your voice Is like your plumage, You are the phoenix of all the inhabitants of these woods.)

The raven sings and drops the cheese he is holding in his beak. The fox, not content with getting the better of the bird, adds a little lesson,

Mon bon Monsieur,
Apprenez que tout flatteur
Vit aux dépens de celui qui l'écoute

(Learn that every flatterer Lives at the expense of the one who listens to him.)

As if that were not enough, for the French the corbeau is the writer of poison-pen letters. Something should be done for the raven brand en France.

In German, there are Wotan’s ravens, rather more powerful than La Fontaine’s, they are his eyes that fly over the earth and report back to their master. That presumably why one of the US observation drones has been named “raven”. As Time Magazine tells us: “Already soldiers carry hand-launchable Raven surveillance drones”. I’m only surprised that there is a Wagner fan in the US Army unit responsible for naming drones, though on second thoughts why not?

Christian Morgenstern had rather poorer view of the raven, seeing it as a kind parrot:

Der Rabe Ralf

        will will hu hu
    dem niemand half
        still still du du
    half sich allein
    am Rabenstein
        will will still still
            hu hu

And in the Winterreise, the raven is evidence winter and the cold:

“Da war es kalt und finster,
Es schrien die Raben vom Dach.”

(It was cold and dark, the ravens cried from the roof.)

In Estonian, a raven-mother is the evil mother who neglects her children and, maybe, exploits them, not unlike the wicked stepmother of many a fairy tale.

The Hungarian view of the raven is rather more divided. On the negative side, there is the legend, one I was certainly brought up with, that the raven was once white, but now washes his son on Good Friday, because – so the mythic narrative – when Christ was in hiding, He was seen by the raven (cf. Wotan) and shouted “kár, kár”, (meaning “what a pity” or “shame”).

For this he was eternally punished by being turned forever black, the colour of sin, and having to eat carrion.

Ravenstone is known in Hungarian, not just in English – hollókő is the word and there is a castle of this name, but its putative origin differs considerably from the English. According to the legend, there was once a castle at Pusztavárhegy and the lord of castle, one András Kacsis kidnapped a beautiful maiden, but he evidently chose his target badly, because the young woman’s nursemaid was witch. The nursemaid then did a deal with the devil to free the maiden and that was how it came to be that many demons assumed the form of ravens and carried away the stones of Kacsis’s castle, leaving mere earthworks behind. The stones were taken  to a massive, high rock where an entirely new fortress was assembled, and this is called Hollókő.

So, it’s not enough that Hungarian ravens have to do the annual cleansing ritual on Good Friday, they are also the spawn of devil, though usefully employed in the building trade. Incidentally, the story doesn’t tell whether the kidnapped maiden lived happily ever after. Or not, as the case may be.

As against this, the raven on the coat of arms of the Hunyadi family is still celebrated. Matthias Corvinus bears his name, Arany wrote a ballad about the raven as a first rate messenger and the former Karl Marx University in Budapest is now the Corvinus University. There’s a lesson in there somewhere.

Sch. Gy.

Serbia and Hungary

There is an exhibition of Serbian religious art in Hungary currently at the Balassi Institute, Brussels. The opening was held on 13 February; this is an edited text of my remarks. A video version of what I said can be found here or here.

We have been together a long time, Serbs and Hungarians. I did a little research this afternoon to look into the history and there was interaction between the Serbian and Hungarian monarchies from early on, despite the adherence of the one to Byzantium and the other to Rome. As every Hungarian schoolchild knows, or did when I was young, the relief by János Hunyadi of the siege of Nándorfehérvár (Beograd to the Serbs, but it’s the same “white castle”) in 1456 was a key event that halted the northward expansion of the Ottomans for several generations.

The same fate, conquest by the Ottomans overtook us both, though we were fortunate that Hungary was just that bit further to the north and thus at the outer limit of the Ottoman empire’s military capabilities and we were freed from the Ottomans a century and a half sooner. That allowed the kings of Hungary, by then the Hapsburgs, to allow Arsenije III to bring the 37,000 Serbian families to the Vojvodina as refugees. They then became the guardians of the marches, the graničari; their descendants live in Vojvodina to this day.

Some of the Serbs settled in Szentendre, (and in some other towns on the Danube, like Ráckeve) and were active in the water-borne trade on the Danube. The wealth of some of these merchants, the export-import multinationals of the time, was to pay for the religious art that we can see here tonight.

Of course there were unhappy interactions as well, in 1848-1849, and the Second World War brought about the lowest point, with vicious massacres on both sides. The truth about these terrible events is slowly being brought to light by Serbian and Hungarian historians working together.

But the meeting point between Western and Eastern Christianity produced its own complex interactions and mutual influences, which have left their mark on both parties. In sum, Western Christianity has always accepted a multiplicity of forms and complexity as a central features of life. The doctrine of Purgatory meant the acceptance of intermediacy between good and evil, between Heaven and Hell, together with the possibility of redemption. The Reformation meant an end to Catholic Universalism and gave rise to a competitive religious environment. Orthodox Christianity, on the other hand, insisted on the unity of the physical and the metaphysical, the transience of life on this earth, and the role of the collective together with the individual conscience.

The art produced by Western Christianity sought to portray beauty as the gift of God (in the south) and the fragility, emotion, and realism of religious belief (north of the Alps). Protestantism mostly abjured pictorial representation in the religious realm, although it built on the realism and was brought to its peak by Rembrandt. Orthodox art reflected something else. It emphasised the unchanging quality of the sacred, a stillness and relied on two-dimensionality to portray this.

What we can see here tonight is a subtle blend of the Orthodox style touched by elements of the Baroque, in a manner one never finds in Russia in St. Petersburg or Moscow or Pskov. The pictures in this exhibition indicate that these mostly unknown icon painters accepted three-dimensionality and a sense of colour that brings them to within hailing distance of the Western tradition of art, while remaining clearly Orthodox in inspiration. The only parallel I know in art history (and I’m no expert) is the Venetian tradition that lived on until the 17th century, the paintings representing groups of saints in the sacra conversazione depicted by Giovanni Bellini for one, but traces can be found in Titian too.

So my congratulations to the organisers, what they have put on is genuinely a product of the best of Serbian-Hungarian relations.

Sch. Gy.

Kurdish issue in Turkey

A debate was held in the European Parliament on the 6 February to discuss the Turkish-Kurdish dialogue. This is a slightly edited version of my contribution.

The Kurdish problem was built into the Turkish political system from the outset. The Kurdish population of Turkey was denied its political rights as Kurds and as the country modernised, they began to demand changes. The Turkish state, with its strongly centralising tradition, refused and the result was violence, a low-level insurgency that has claimed many lives.

What has changed in the last few years has been the slow shift in the attitude of the Turkish government that is moving, however reluctantly, towards accepting that the suppression of the Kurds doesn’t work. Equally, the emergence of a very extensive autonomy in the Kurdish region of Iraq has shown that the Kurds are perfectly capable of acting as a factor of stability and do not threaten Turkish territorial integrity.

Against this background, it is vital that the Turkish government recognise that without accepting the Kurds as equal citizens, the Turkish state will be scene of ongoing conflict, one that will gravely weaken the chances of sustaining a functioning democracy.

Let there be no illusions about this. The change we are discussing requires a redesign of the Turkish state and citizenship concept, a shift away from the mono-ethnic basis that has marked Turkey since its emergence from the Ottoman Empire. It has to become markedly more tolerant towards those of its citizens who are not ethnically Turks or Sunni Muslim.

But the Kurds too will have to accept that their future lies in Turkey and that they should not dream of restoring the state that was promised them after the First World War by the West (the Treaty of Sèvres). Territorial integrity is a neuralgic point for any state.

That is what the transformation is about and we should not pretend that it will be easy. Giving up bad habits is always hard.

Sch. Gy.