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Monday, 27 June 2011

Where has all the power gone?


It is a standard complaint that voter participation is declining, that turn-outs are low and consequently the democratic legitimation of legislators is not what it used to be. Hardly anyone seems to be asking the question, though, as to why; what is about voters that they have lost their commitment to or enthusiasm for high politics? The change can hardly be attributed to some inexplicable force or event or process. There ought to be some rational explanation.

Maybe there is. The hard reality is that party politics and legislatures have given away or lost or transferred a great deal of the power that they once enjoyed and have done this in the name (and practice) of better democracy. If we accept that the traditional model of majoritarian democracy is no longer compatible with democracy as defined today, but that procedures and mechanisms have been devised to ensure a concept of citizenship that – ideally – means that minorities are not bent to the will of majorities, then the dilution of party politics is a necessary development.

So what has happened is that voters have recognised that the importance of parliaments, governments and political parties has diminished because power lies elsewhere. Whether this elsewhere is entirely desirable from the perspective of democracy is open to question, especially so when we look at who the new actors with power are.

The new economic actors are obviously the most significant. Multinationals, banks, hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, high finance are taking decisions that directly affect the lives of millions, but the latter have no voice, no capacity to influence that decision making and elected politicians appear likewise to have been disempowered.

But there is more. There has been a proliferation of other new political actors, broadly covered by the label civil society. Some of them see themselves as anti-political, in as much as they do not want to supplant elected governments, merely to influence them in one direction or another. Of course, these anti-political actors are, indeed, exercising power – less than governments, for sure – but a good deal all the same. The new political actors include pressure groups, lobbies, trade associations, advocacy groups and the like, and what is striking about their activities is that while they demand transparency and accountability from elected legislators, they don’t practice it very much themselves. Note too that the state is often enough quite happy to deal directly with civil society, by-passing politicians. The state itself is, similarly, a political actor, although it likes to pretend otherwise, through its autonomy over society and, all too often, vis-à-vis legislatures which simply cannot keep a check on delegated legislation and bureaucratic discretion.

One of the thorniest problem of all in contemporary democracy is that of the media. In democratic theory, the media constitute a vital check on both formal political decisions making and on the executive. In so doing the media themselves exercise power for which they are in no way accountable. Who has ever heard of an elected journalist, say? But the last two decades have seen the media undergo a shift towards populism and sensationalism, towards regarding the news as entertainment rather than civic activity and they are wholly shameless in denying voice to weaker political actors – in effect, the media are exercising a kind of authoritarian rule -  political power without countervailing force.

To add to this, the multiplicity of actors with access to power exacerbates the consistency problem that I discussed in an earlier entry (8 May). Inevitably, it has become much more difficult for governments to pursue an unwavering political strategy without eliciting howls of outrage from those whose power is weakened as a result.

As a footnote to foregoing, a few words about Fidesz. At least a part of the unbelievable detestation that Fidesz attracts should be traced back to its contrarian strategy. It has, indeed, generated strong party politics, helped certainly by the far-reaching political polarisation in Hungary, not to mention the barely credible mess left behind by its left-wing predecessors, which Fidesz is determined to clear up. It’s an exceptional situation, at least to that extent.

Thus the Fidesz government has launched an economic strategy that, again, goes counter to conventional wisdom; it has sought to regulate the media’s excesses; and it has launched a major reform of pubic administration. It has ignored vested interests and special pleading and has had the temerity to use its two-thirds majority to pursue a far-reaching reform strategy. In essence, it has behaved like a traditional political party implementing its mandate for change, much to the consternation of the onlookers, though not the voters who continue to give the government their support.

Who knows, maybe there is even a soupçon of envy that Fidesz has the majority and is ready to go ahead with its own strategies. Against this background, the opprobrium becomes understandable, especially as a Fidesz success will upset a great deal of conventional thinking, which will require rethinking received ideas. And that is a perfect way to court unpopularity, no one likes to rethink their assumptions.
Sch. Gy

Saturday, 18 June 2011

Szlovénia elszigeteli Magyarországot !

E Slovenia semper aliquid novum?* Szlovéniából mindig valami újdonság? Alig. Ha szomszédaink közül a legunalmasabbat kell kijelölni, akkor nagy valószínűséggel Szlovénia lenne a nyertes. És mégis, íme a meglepő hír: a szlovén miniszterelnök, Borut Pahor, kijelentette, hogy mihelyt vége az EU elnökségnek, “Magyarországot politikailag el fogjuk szigetelni, abszolút mértékben”.

Első látszatra ez a kijelentés több kérdést vet fel. Ki itt a “mi”? Hogyan? Pahor egyedül vagy kivel együtt? Vagy tekintsük az egészet egy kis közép-európai abszurdnak? (Mégis, ebben a műfajban komoly tapasztalataink vannak.) És ne felejtsük el, hogy a szlovén miniszterelnök úr egy baráti szomszéd államról beszél, ill. hogy mindketten EU és NATO tagsággal rendelkezünk.

Nem, nem, nehezen lehet elfogadni, hogy Pahor csupán saját ellenszenvének ad nyilvánosságot. Bár tetszetős az abszurditás, mint magyarázat, a kijelentésnek elkerülhetetlenül szélesebb politikai tartalma kell, hogy legyen. Pahor kormánya baloldali, és ebből az kategóriából már csak összesen négy maradt az EU-ban (ráadásul a görög és spanyol kormányok körül nagyon is ritkul a levegő), arról nem is szólva, hogy Pahor kormánya elvesztette parlamenti többségét.

Akkor inkább arról lehet szó, hogy Pahor mozgósít, ill. hogy valamelyest elhamarkodva ugyan, világossá teszi az összeurópai baloldal jövőbeli taktikáját: Magyarországot és kormányát kell kinyilvánítani Európa legaljasabb jobboldali gonosztevőjének. Ha helyes ez az elemzés, akkor az, amit eddig láttunk a médiatörvény és az alkotmány kapcsán: csupán ízelítő. Özönvíz? Nem lehet kizárni.
Sch.Gy

* Emlékeztetni szeretném tisztelt olvasóinkat, hogy ez egy többnyelvű blog.
 


Tuesday, 14 June 2011

Lázárföld - Лазарево- Lazarsfeld

Mladicsot másfél évtized után elfogják Lazarevoban. A totális banalitás. Vagy inkább mindez azt mutatja, hogy a "szerb társadalom" ennyi idő elteltével képes elfogadni "nemzeti hősük" letartóztatását és kiadatását a hágai ítélőszéknek? De vissza a banalitáshoz. Egy kis földrajzi és helytörténeti ismeret azonnal leleplezi ezt a banalitást.

Nagykikinda. Bánság (Bánát). Vajdaság. A terület múltja beszédes, mégsem él a köztudatban, hogy mennyi náció, identitás rakódik le az alig kétszáz éves falura. Érdemes egy kicsit a felszínt megkapargatni, s akkor jöjjön egy kis történelem, néhol a magyar történelmet meghatározó évszámokkal. Röviden a történet arról szól, hogy XIX. század legelején valahol a vad dél-keleten örmény katolikusok, akik német ajkúak (svábok?) települnek le – a bécsi udvar oltalma alatt, és felvirágoztatják a mocsaras, kietlen vidéket. Ráadásul a szomszédos népek marosmenti románok, szerbek a Határőrvidéken, horvátok, bolgárok, magyarok igaz, alig-alig, részt vesznek ebben a munkában. Majd a Habsburg-ellenesség 1848-ban tetőfokára hág: magyarok fellázadnak és a szerbeknek is megjön az étvágya.  A forradalmat leverik, marad a német uralom. Aztán 1918, 1944, 1946 1995 és Mladics, közben népek jönnek-mennek, elhurcoltatnak, lemészároltatnak, és újból betelepülnek. A kontinuitás ma is létezik, csak másképp.

1781-ben Lázár Lukács erzsébetvárosi marhakereskedő árverésen megveszi Écskát és környékét. Természetesen Lázár nem holmi egyszerű marhakereskedő, hanem a császári osztrák-magyar sereg ellátmányozásának tiszteletbeli alezredese, aki hadiszállítóként óriásira növeli vagyonát, korábban személyes jó kapcsolatot ápol Mária Teréziával, sőt a család generációkon keresztül a Habsburg udvarral. Ilyen háttérrel nem volt nehéz az uradalomban a legmodernebb mezőgazdaság technológiát bevezetni és fölvirágoztatni a környéket (még Liszt Ferenc is adott itt koncertet 1820-ban), hiszen az egész birodalomra kiterjedő kereskedelemmel bírtak. A titok a folyóban rejlik, a Béga ivóvíz és szállítási, közlekedési pálya egyben. Valamint az állítólagos földesúri "kegyetlenségben" - talán ma a sváb szigor maradt meg mindebből.

A Lázár család 3 falut is alapított az uradalom területén, amelyeket különféle nemzetiségekkel telepítették be, Lázárföld (1809) mind a mai napig viseli alapítója nevét, az etnikai összetétel azonban évtizderől-évtizedre változik.

Igaz, nem csak anyagi javak adták a sikerét az új településnek, Lázár gondoskodott arról, hogy a hit is szervező és megtartó erőként jelen legyen, így magával hozta a Mechitaritsa örmény katolikus rendet. A rend alapító mondata, így szól „vedd el egy nemzet nyelvét, és elszárad az a nemzet”.

Földesurai Lázárföldnek: Lázár Lukács, Lázár Ágoston, Lázár Zsigmond, Lázár Marianne és férje Harnoncourt Félix (Az utolsó Harnoncourt grófi sarj még az 1950-es években a faluban élt, a többiek persze Kanadába vándoroltak)

És egy kis kitérő 1848-ra. Jókora felfordulást hozott a forradalom Délvidéken, szerbek számára a Független Szerb Vajdaság volt a cél, de a forradalom levertével nem a szerbek által választott vajda került a Szerb Vajdaság és Temesi Bánság (1860-ig létezett közigazgatásilag, de nem úgy, ahogy a szerbek elképzelték) élére, hanem maga Ferenc József nagyvajdai címmel, alvajda pedig Meyerhofer tábornok lett).

Az ezt követő időszak Lázárföld és a térség aranykora is egyben, egészen 1918 december 1-jéig a Szerb-Horvát-Szlovén Királyság kikiáltásáig. Megkezdődött az újabb "népvándorlás", amit elősegített, hogy a "rendezetlen állampolgárságú" nem szlávok nem igényelhettek földeket. Elmentek, mások jöttek. 1929 újabb közigazgatási kiigazítás a szerbek javára. Persze a revans sem maradt el 1941 decemberében a Hideg Napokon (2500 szerb áldozat). Majd a viszont revans revansa: 1944 október 18-án megkezdődik a magyarok és a németek táborba gyűjtése, és a megtorló intézkedések (20000 körüli magyar áldozat). És a népvándorlás tovább folytatódik: Lázárföldre boszniai szerbeket telepítettek a II. világháború után. A római katolikus templomot 1948-ban elkezdik széthordani, 1980-ban végleg elbontják, anyakönyveket megsemmisítik, a hívők nélkül maradt evangélikus templomot az ortodox egyház veszi át. A monda úgy tartja, hogy a lázárföldeik maguk adták el Úristenüket, a pléh Krisztus eltűnt a feszületről, ahogy az egykor német telepesek leszármazottai is.

Szerbek lakják ma, boszniai szerbek. Mladics hazatért. A tizenötperces hír(név) itt véget ér.

kng

Monday, 13 June 2011

The European Parliament’s Debate on the Hungarian constitution


Last Wednesday’s debate (8 June) on the Hungarian constitution was remarkable for two main features. The left launched a sustained attack on the Hungarian basic law in the name of (otherwise undefined) European values, which, they alleged, its provisions flouted. These European values were not only left undefined, but whatever the definition might have been was entirely in the hands of the left. The left’s position came over almost as a kind of secret knowledge special to it and it alone. Whenever speakers from the left were challenged to produce chapter and verse for their allegations, they retreated into vague, and often enough, vapid generalities.

What the left seemed quite incapable of understanding is that European values – and these certainly do exist – cannot be and will never be regarded as being a left-wing monopoly. If they are to be genuinely European, then they must include inputs from the democratic centre-right, otherwise these values will be unrepresentative and thus lack legitimacy. The left entirely failed to understand this.

Second, if these values are to be fully and incontrovertibly European, then they must be reflected in all the constitutions of the 27 member states. Yet repeated attempts to make comparisons with other constitutions were either ignored by left-wing speakers or rejected as irrelevant. The subject of the debate, they averred, was the Hungarian basic law and other states’ constitutions were off the agenda. This is methodological nonsense, of course, and more than anything else demonstrates the intellectual poverty of the left (as it emerged in this debate anyway). In brief, this is the left’s consistency problem, one that they appear to have some trouble identifying; the voters do not.

In some respects matters are worse. Precisely because left-wing speaker after speaker refused to have anything to do with the comparative approach and insisted on a purely Hungarian focus, the debate left behind a lingering sense of double standards and Hungary-bashing. It came over as a left-wing assertion that there was an open season on Hungary, presumably because the left is quite incapable of coming to terms with a democratically elected centre-right Fidesz government that has gained a constitutional majority and has launched a historically far-reaching reform programme.

Let’s try a thought experiment. Suppose that by chance a centre-left government had gained a two-thirds majority, does anyone seriously think that it would not use this mandate as radically as it could?

And there was one further noteworthy aspect to the debate. The Slovak MEPs were able to unite from left to right and back again around the proposition that the Hungarian citizenship law, which allows any Hungarian to apply for citizenship regardless of where they live, was a danger to European values. Oddly, they were not deterred in their endeavours by the fact that the Hungarian citizenship law is not a part of the constitution. By the same token none of them mentioned that the Hungarian citizenship law is very similar to the Slovak citizenship law, very similar indeed. Most strange.

Sch.Gy

Saturday, 4 June 2011

Trianon


Today is the 91st anniversary of the Treaty of Trianon, by the terms of which Hungary lost more than two-thirds of its territory and well over 3 million Hungarians found themselves citizens of another state without their consent. This event continues to mark the Hungarian identity to this day. A year ago, a conference was held in Budapest to discuss the topic. This was my contribution. (A magyar változat a honlapomon érhető el: www.schopflingyorgy.hu).

This Europe of ours is enormously varied, perspectives are different and it can be hard work trying to understand one another’s problems and have them understood.

Here is the Trianon issue, which we’ve been discussing these two days. For the average person in France, the Trianon palace has no particular significance. As against this, for Hungarians Trianon is a memory, a symbol, indeed a brand that suffuses Hungarian consciousness, one that acts as an insurmountable obstacle, as an evil spirit that haunts us.

For the outside world, this is a Hungarian phobia, often enough an infantile, ridiculous psychosis, that – so it is believed – Hungarians should leave behind them and give up this really rather suspect grubbing about in the remote past. And more, there is an implicit, sometimes explicit suspicion that Trianon is the code-word for frontier revision, that those who pronounce Trianon are dreaming of reattaching the lost territories.

Even while there is virtually no one who has these dreams, ill-intentioned outsiders do not accept the denial. And this raises the question, why not? Why does this mutual misunderstanding live on?

On both sides there are half conscious, sometimes wholly unconscious assumptions. Outsiders find it hard to accept that Trianon should still count 90 years on – what belongs to the past should stay there, what has this to do with the shared European present? From the Hungarian side what hurts is the failure to understand that Trianon is a trauma.

It’s this trauma that I like to discuss. These thoughts came to me, as it happens, while reading Milan Kundera’s book Une rencontre, written in French. Kundera describes his encounter with the literature of Martinique and the still vivid experience of slavery. What did slavery actually mean? For the Africans forcibly removed from Africa, it meant and means helplessness, defencelessness and humiliation. In a word the total loss of agency.

What happened to Hungary in 1920 was not slavery, not for one moment – I don’t in any way want to be misunderstood here – but it incontrovertibly meant being deprived of agency for the Hungarian state and nation. The parallel is clear. This is the trauma of Trianon.

This trauma could have vanished had the new frontiers of the country paid attention to the identity, belonging and wishes of the population. This did not happen. Every subsequent attempt to bring about a reordering on the basis of national belonging failed. Hence the trauma of Trianon was repeatedly reproduced, essentially because large numbers of Hungarians live beyond the frontiers of Hungary. And these Hungarians insist on their identity as Hungarians and on the land where they were born.

Let me add that Hungary is not alone when it comes to traumas. Verdun was like this for the French for a long time and when I lived in Britain, the terrible ordeal of the First World War was repeatedly aired on television.

So, what is to be done, que faire? What is desirable? In a word, catharsis, overcoming Trianon. This, however, needs several processes. There should be a solemn recognition by the West that Hungary suffered a historic injustice at Trianon. And at the same time, Hungary’s neighbours should accept that the Hungarians who live there will always be Hungarian and be treated in accordingly. This means that they should enjoy civic rights fully equal to those of the majority nation; that they should feel themselves as being equal to those of us in Hungary; and that Europe - the neighbouring states and Hungary itself included - should accept them as an organic part of Europe's diversity, because only by this means will the Europe of "unity in diversity" develop further.
Sch.Gy