Are there sacred cows in democratic politics? Ideas,
institutions, procedures that may not be questioned, criticised or challenged?
The answer is yes, however surprising that may be, seeing that democracy is the
grandchild of the Enlightenment and the Enlightenment stands for the
questioning of everything. There can be no privileged knowledge, no special
status, no opt-outs from ongoing enquiry. Or so goes the theory.
In reality, the reality that is constituted by the
current assumptions of the EU, the US, the IMF, NATO, Council of Europe etc.,
the democracy agenda in other words, as well as the ideas that have grown up
around it, seem to be exempting an ever wider area of power from scrutiny.
The result, of course, is that an area of democracy
thereby becomes depoliticised, that in turn means that the bodies in question
are not open to questioning and those disadvantaged by this exercise of power
have to live with their frustration. Frustration, as we know all too well or
should, breeds resentment and that gives heart to those labelled as populists,
extremists and others placed in that category.
What institutions, then, fall into this category? A
broad-brush list would certainly include constitutional courts, national banks,
civil society and, increasingly, the international guardians of democracy, all
too often the self-appointed guardians. Note that there is nothing new in
certain institutions being sacralised in this way. In the 1970s, it was the
state and the working class that enjoyed this status, buoyed up by the legacy
of Marxist, Marxisant and sub-Marxist thinking.
As far as the international guardians are concerned,
the question of reciprocity, transparency, accountability – legitimacy at the
end of the day – really does not apply and does not do so in spades. Their
right to tell other states how to run democracy is decidedly precarious,
especially if that right is exercised in one direction only. The international
treaties that are generally the reference point seldom provide a carte blanche
for intervention. The right to intervene, though it may be wrapped in the
sweet-paper of “advice”, is never open to the challenge on the part of the
citizens of the state that is the recipient of the sweet-paper wrapping, even
although the “advisers” are supposedly acting on their behalf.
Is this intervention desired? No one knows. Some
lobbies may welcome it, especially if the intervention serves their interests,
but the majority? Doubtful. Is the power that is exercised by “advisers”
democratic? Hardly. Does the intervention strengthen resentment and increase
support for non-democratic and semi-democratic forces? Certainly. Is it
counter-productive? Is the Pope Catholic?
What really angers public opinion in the countries at
the receiving end of “well-meant” advice about democracy and democratic
behaviour is that there is no come-back. The critics may be Arcadian shepherds
living in glass houses (to merge my metaphors), but no country is and should be
beyond reproach. The proposition that a country pulled by the scruff of its
neck by a self-appointed repository of democratic virtue can tolerate this
without, at least, the capacity to respond in equal measure to its critics is
simply not true. It does not and cannot happen. The outcome is a double standard
and there is nothing like a double standard to erode trust, credibility and
democracy itself.
As far as the sacralised domestic institutions are
concerned, the problem is a little different. They acquire their political
legitimacy via the elected parliament and are thus an emanation of popular
sovereignty, but the parliament in question then must abandon all right to any
say as to how these bodies work. The assumption, tacit for sure, is that these
institutions will work with Platonic objectivity, will have no personal or
institutional interests that distort this objectivity and will invariably know
best. On this assumption, they quite likely have access to perfect knowledge,
the philosopher’s stone and Harry Potter’s mobile phone number.
There is a counter-argument to all this, that these
bodies are a necessary part of the democratic infrastructure and constitute the
vital checks and balances without which democracy inevitably defaults into
majoritarian tyranny. This is a genuine point and must be addressed. Without
intermediate institutions a democracy is not worthy of the name and given that
popular sovereignty can never be expressed as the views of the entirety of the
people, minorities must enjoy protection of their rights as citizens are to be
addressed and safeguarded.
The problem, however, is the growing sacralisation of
these bodies, their exemption from criticism, their being under no particular
obligation to exercise their functions with due attention to self-limitation
and to transparency. If these trends continue, then the clash between popular
sovereignty and the system of checks and balances will only intensify and
democracy will be the loser.
Sch. Gy.
