Understanding another country - its politics, society culture, preconceptions - is always more difficult than appears at first sight. Matters are made worse when those whose job it is to "translate" a country don't make a particularly good job of it. One of the factors that make this understanding difficult is what might be called "the discursive deficit". The voice of a small culture with its own very different language is by definition weaker than that of a large cultural community - English is universally understood, Hungarian is not. The result is that what is known about Hungary will necessarily include misunderstandings, blank spots, ignorance, prejudice and an impatience with the explanations that the smaller country provides, especially if these explanations do not fit the expectations of the "translators". The outcome is all too often a set of naturalised, reductionist beliefs treated as fact, and these beliefs are extremely difficult to shake. What we have, in effect, is a wholesale neglect of evidence-based argument and its replacement by ideology, prejudice or ignorance, which can reasonably be called an epistemological closure. In the Hungarian case this attitude has gone so far that we can safely speak of a presumption of guilt regarding whatever the Hungarian government says or does. For all practical purposes, it has to prove its innocence.
The starting point for any accurate assessment of Hungary is that it is a deeply divided society. There are two radically different narratives - one from the left and one from the right - and the two have minimal respect for one another. It is all but impossible for outsiders to recognise or understand or accept this. The concept of there being something like two Hungarian societies, each with its own idea of the truth, is entirely alien to the ideal-typical model of a democratic European state. Yet that is the Hungarian reality. Listening to only one side will automatically distort one's understanding of what is going on in Hungary.
From the above it follows that the international media represent only one side of the argument, only one of the two narratives is reflected, that which is closer to one's own preconceptions. The narrative that the media have accepted is that of the left, that of the opposition and it adds up to the assumption that what the left says is the sole truth. A glance at The Guardian’s website, for one, will show that the overwhelming majority of articles on Hungary are hostile to the present government – some are neutral – indicating that even the pretence of even-handedness is absent. What the left says and how it communicates unquestionably have a better fit with the prior assumptions of most Western journalists, who are inherently suspicious of power and especially of centre-right governments.
The full list of charges against the Fidesz government is long and invariably based on a distortion or a misunderstanding. Here is a partial list:
- under the new constitution abortion has been banned. No, it has not.
- judges of the constitutional court are obliged to take early retirement. Not so.
- the powers of the constitutional court have been drastically curtailed. No, they remain the same, except that the court may not intervene in budgetary matters which are the preserve of parliament.
- the new electoral law overtly favours Fidesz. No it does not, as several analyses have demonstrated.
- the independence of the central bank has been eliminated. Untrue.
- the institution of marriage is the union of a man and a woman. This is correct, but does not affect same-sex civil partnerships. Besides, this was already established by the 1949 constitution as revised in 1989-1990, i.e. no change.
- the media law has put an end to the freedom of expression. Only someone who knows no Hungarian and does not read the media can say this. The reality is that there is constant, far-reaching criticism of the government published in the media.
- the Media Authority has been filled by Fidesz cronies. The members of the Media Authority are professionals; how they vote is immaterial.
- Klub rádió was denied a new licence because it was critical of the Government. No, Klub rádió’s application for the renewal of its frequency was rejected because it failed to meet the required technical and legal specifications. It would have broken the law to have renewed it.
- the citizenship law, which makes it possible for Hungarians living in the neighbouring countries to acquire Hungarian citizenship, is an assault on those neighbours. In fact, Hungary is bringing its legislation into line with the equivalent Slovak, Croatian and Romanian citizenship laws; these have not troubled anyone.
- Fidesz is covertly in league with Jobbik. No, it is not, and a brief glance at Jobbik’s regular criticism of Fidesz in the harshest terms will demonstrate that there is no collusion between Fidesz and Jobbik.
In this light with such an enormous quantity of misinformation (and even disinformation) in circulation, it is not surprising that it is extremely difficult for non-Hungarian media, for diplomats, for NGOs, civil society to accept the deep divide that constitutes the reality of Hungarian politics. It is even more difficult for them to see that the Hungarian left takes no prisoners where the Fidesz government, and above all the prime minister, Viktor Orbán, are concerned. Hungarian readers and viewers have become used to the extreme language that passes for political conversation in Hungary. Outsiders may discount some of the demonisation that the left routinely allows itself, but will assume that some of it must be true.
This manifest failure to grapple with Hungarian realities, and the readiness to rely on convenient clichés like "populism", "extremism", "xenophobia" and "anti-Semitism" (all used against the Hungarian government), makes a mockery of journalistic objectivity, neutral reporting and journalistic detachment - the assumptions that underpin and legitimate journalism. These clichés establish an opponent or an enemy, with those engaged in the "struggle" against them occupying the high moral ground. Too often, those who report on Hungary accept what their interlocutors tell them and fail to interrogate their sources.
In this light, it is not surprising that the context of Hungarian politics today is mostly absent from the way in which Hungary and the Hungarian government are treated. Crucial here is the absence of any consideration of how and why the centre-right obtained a two-thirds majority in the 2010 elections and what its project has been since. The eight years in office of the centre-left (2002-2010) were a complete disaster in terms of the welfare of society, the furthering of a democratic political culture and, above all, clean government - on the contrary, the left was unbelievably corrupt. The leftwing parties never accepted or acknowledged their years of bad governance.
The central point here is that both the political and the economic system were in tatters, to such an extent that whoever had won the elections would have had to introduce far-reaching changes. The reality was that the system in Hungary was at best a façade democracy. The left behaved as if its success in winning the 2006 elections gave it the right to rule as if there were no opposition, no civil society, no democratic infrastructure to sustain. In this context it is important to note that the division in Hungarian society was also reflected in civil society; left wing NGOs very seldom criticised the Gyurcsány government. The response of the human rights NGOs to the violent suppression of the 23 October Fidesz demonstrations of that year was virtually inaudible.
Gyurcsány’s so called “lying speech”, in which he admitted that the left had won the elections by lying, not only left his government with next to no legitimacy, but undermined society’s trust in democracy, certainly where the left was concerned. Above all institutional authority was weak, the state machinery worked badly – all too often state institutions were used to the benefit of the left or even as money laundries – and the essential trust between government and society was massively eroded. It is worth adding that in a society as divided as Hungary’s, it is extraordinarily difficult to operate institutions. Neither side accepted the legitimacy and authority of the other, hence institutions and regulation were assumed to be a part of party political activity. Few people accepted the neutrality of the state and local government and saw political motivation in what they did. The spreading corruption only exacerbated this state of affairs. For all practical purposes, there was no uniform distribution of authority.
Fidesz’s two-thirds majority was regarded, therefore, not just as a devastating defeat for the left, but as a mandate to restore good governance and to ensure that the damage done by the left could never be repeated. The left’s disastrous eight years in power had a further, unexpected consequence – the striking strengthening of the radical right in the form of Jobbik. Jobbik has been as much a part of the opposition since 2010 as the left and constant attempts by the left to assert that Fidesz and Jobbik are one and the same only demonstrates the intellectual desperation or the political cynicism of the left or both. For that matter, these attempts by the left to argue that there is no real difference between Fidesz and Jobbik point towards a deeper problem, namely that the Hungarian left appears to have no theory of the democratic centre-right and, hence, to assume that they and they alone own democracy.
Fidesz’s far-reaching reform programme should, therefore, be seen in this light, as a serious project to ensure that democratic institutions work properly, that corruption is rooted out thoroughly and, perhaps most importantly, that trust in politics – at a low ebb by 2010 – is restored, that the relationship between government and society is based on reciprocity. Inevitably, a programme as thoroughgoing as Hungary’s has generated opposition as vested interests are tackled, accountability and transparency are reinstituted, as working habits in the public sphere are upgraded and as the political culture of the country is slowly changed. History will tell how successful the transformation is.
The neglect of this context, which, of course, is entirely to the advantage of the left, and indeed the easy ride given by international opinion to the centre-left government, are seen in Hungary as the seed-bed of misunderstanding and inconsistency. The latter is a potent source of resentment.
What is highly ironic in all this is that no one seems to have noticed that the Hungarian government and opposition exist in a kind of negative reciprocity. The left has constructed its identity around the proposition that Fidesz is in league with the devil, that it is racist, xenophobic and somehow the embodiment of evil. Fidesz sees the left, and thus derives some of its own legitimacy, from the proposition that it is irresponsible, corrupt and has never been willing to shed its communist-era baggage, the human rights violations committed during the communist era most of all. This negative interdependence is an aspect of the polarisation that allows the left to ignore the aspirations of Hungarian society and Fidesz to regard the external dependence of the Hungarian left as illegitimate. This assessment seldom if ever forms a part of the picture that the media paint.
Those who deal with Hungary consistently and systematically neglect several other key factors that are vital to understanding realities, notably the solid support that the government continues to enjoy, despite a deteriorating economic situation. The pro-government demonstration of the 21 January saw around 400,000 people in the streets of Budapest. This was severely underreported, whereas the much smaller anti-government demonstration of the 2 January was given far more attention. Many Hungarians are aware of this double standard and resent it.
Nor has anyone noticed - or so it would appear - the effect of these attacks on Hungarian opinion - the marked strengthening of support for Fidesz, but also for Jobbik, the right-radical party which currently enjoys the support of around a quarter of the electorate, about the same as the three left-wing parties combined. So much for unintended consequences. A further such consequence is that the attacks are helpful to the government in providing grounds for arguing that external intervention is distorting the government's strategy. It is clear that even some of the centre-right critics of Fidesz are lining up behind it under the impact of external criticism.
Correspondingly, the left wing opposition is faced with a gravely weakened domestic legitimation (not to mention popularity) and has opted to look for support abroad. This is an odd state of affairs, when the political opposition in a democratic state has come close to abandoning its voters and tries to sustain itself by mobilising allies abroad, whose Hungarian legitimation is negligible. The effect has, again, been to strengthen support for the government, even from among those who may not be particularly well disposed to Fidesz, but resent what they see as foreign intervention. Besides, this constant criticism of Hungary from abroad by reference to European values has had the further consequence of bringing those values into question, if not actual disrespect.
The role of external actors in the internal affairs of EU member states is an increasingly acute issue (technocratic governments in Greece and Italy, the floating of a proposal to impose a budget commissioner on Greece). The project by the European left to launch a procedure against Hungary under Article 7 of the Treaty on European Union, which would if successful deprive Hungary of its voting rights, can be placed in this context. This raises a number of intriguing questions. Is the EU an internal actor in relation to a member state or an external one? Where is the boundary line between the two? Can the EU act by majority, without broad consent? How well grounded are the charges against Hungary, because if they are weak, then what we are seeing comes close to a simple political declaration of guilt, in which Hungary's voice is all but inaudible. The hallowed principle of hearing both sides, audi et alteram partem, is being ignored.
This level of intervention in the internal affairs of a member state is generating questions of legitimacy, opposition and mounting scepticism about the value of the EU itself in Hungary, not least because there is no question of reciprocity. External actors seem free to intervene in Hungarian affairs and as far as some are concerned, this certainly includes the destabilisation of the Fidesz government and the ousting of the prime minister. On the other hand, it is inconceivable for Hungary to raise of issues of concern with any hope of being heard, like the anxieties about the Slovak language law which impinges on the rights of the Hungarian minority. The real fear is that small states are being bullied by large states in the name of human rights, (some) European values and leftwing preconceptions, as well as power itself.
External actors are evidently unaware of their role in Hungarian domestic politics. Small countries tend to be far more sensitive to external opinion than large ones. This has given rise to a partially reflexive interaction - Hungarian opinion hears what the foreign actors say, but the reverse is not the case. This generates an intensifying resentment. No one likes it when their domestic affairs undergo sustained intervention from abroad; this explains the placards held up during the 21 January demonstration, "We are not a colony".
In assessing the relationship between Hungary and the EU it is vital to separate out the political and legal dimensions of the story. The legal issues are clear and finite, and are thus open to negotiation and resolution. The political ones are vague and unclear as to what the Hungarian government should do. Matters are exacerbated by habit of the critics of Hungary switching between the two. If the legal objections are met, political ones are raised and vice-versa. In this sense, the rules keep being changed in the midst of the process.
Ultimately it comes down to the question of who decides what European values are, can it be the left alone or must there be a broader consensus? If Hungary is, indeed, found to be in breach of these values, is it the only EU member state that is properly singled out in this way? If not, then should not others also be subjected to infringement procedures and the like? Otherwise a double standard is manifestly in operation. And behind all this there lurks the suspicion that Hungary is being used instrumentally, to deflect attention from shortcomings elsewhere, in the West European member states, which appear to be exporting their guilt eastwards. If this last is accurate, then the role allotted to Hungary is all but accidental. Other states are just as likely to be the target. Indeed, there is more than a suggestion that Romania may be the next on the list.
Sch. Gy.
